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Abstract  
Purpose – This article investigates how buying firms manage their lower tier sustainability 
management (LTSM) in their supply networks and what contextual factors influence the 
choice of approaches. As most of the environmental and social burden is caused in lower tiers 
we use the iceberg analogy. 
Design/methodology/approach – Findings from 12 case studies and 53 interviews, publicly 
available and internal firm data are presented. In an abductive research approach, Transaction 
Cost Economics (TCE) conceptually guides the analytical iteration processes between theory 
and data. 
Findings – This study provides eight LTSM approaches grouped into three categories: direct 
(holistic, product-, region-, and event-specific) indirect (multiplier-, alliance-, and 
compliance-based) and neglect (tier-1-based). Focal firms choose between these approaches 
depending on the strength of observed contextual factors (stakeholder salience, structural 
supply network complexity, product and industry salience, past supply network incidents, 
socio-economic and cultural distance and lower tier supplier dependency), leading to 
perceived sustainability risk (PSR). 
Research limitations/implications – By depicting TCE’s theoretical boundaries in predicting 
LTSM governance modes, the theory is elevated to the supply network level of analysis. 
Future research should investigate LTSM at the purchasing category level of analysis to 
compare and contrast PSR profiles for different purchase tasks and to validate and extend the 
framework. 
Practical implications – This study serves as a blueprint for the development of firms’ 
LTSM capabilities that suit their unique PSR profiles. It offers knowledge regarding what 
factors influence these profiles and presents a model that links the effectiveness of different 
LTSM approaches to resource intensity. 
Originality/value – This study extends the application of TCE and adds empirically to the 
literature on multi-tier and sustainable supply chain management.  
Keywords Case studies, lower tier sustainability management, multi-tier supply chains, 
sustainability risk, sub-suppliers, Transaction Cost Economics  
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1. Introduction  
Buying firms are often held responsible for sustainability-related misconduct in their supply 
network by various stakeholders (Hofmann et al., 2014). This “chain liability effect” (van 
Tulder et al., 2009) places focal firms in danger of suffering reputational damage and 
financial loss from misconduct that occurs beyond their direct control (Seuring and Müller, 
2008). Consequently, many buying firms have adopted strategies and practices to ensure 
sustainable business conduct of their suppliers (Wilhelm et al., 2016a). 
Yet, the current emphasis of sustainable supply chain management (SSCM) is mainly 
centered on direct suppliers (Pagell et al., 2010), which may blind buying firms to those 
critical lower tier suppliers, or nexus suppliers, that can play important roles within supply 
networks (Yan et al., 2015). A major portion of the social and environmental burden occurs at 
suppliers located further upstream in the supply chain during a product’s manufacturing 
process (Tate et al., 2014). Therefore, we construct the analogy to an iceberg, whose greatest 
threat remains invisible when regarded from seemingly safe distance. Recent incidents 
suggest that common practices targeting the improvement of close and visible first-tier 
suppliers are of minimal use in preventing unsustainable behavior of lower tier suppliers 
(Rauer and Kaufmann, 2015). Although the Italian chocolate and confectionery producer 
Ferrero had banned child labor in its code of conduct and although its suppliers had been 
independently audited, Ferrero was severely accused of exploitation and child labor at a sub-
contractor in Romania (Parker, 2016). In response to these negative examples, many firms 
have decided to dig deeper into their upstream supply networks and to conduct lower tier 
sustainability management (LTSM).  
Prior research on SSCM has acknowledged the importance of extending practices 
beyond first-tier suppliers (Tachizawa and Wong, 2014; Wilhelm et al., 2016a; b). However, 
extant research highlights that it is costly and nearly impossible for buying firms to manage 
thousands of lower tier suppliers with respect to their sustainability performance (Rauer and 
Kaufmann, 2015).  
Surprisingly, knowledge on why some firms apply LTSM while others do not is still 
lacking and prior research has not sufficiently addressed which specific approaches to LTSM 
are suitable for the various business and relational contexts that buying firms face in their 
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lower tier supplier environment (exemptions are e.g., Grimm et al., 2016 and Wilhelm et al., 
2016b). Thus, this study seeks to develop testable propositions in answering the following 
research questions: (1) How do buying firms manage their lower tier suppliers for 
sustainability? (2) What contextual factors influence these firms’ choice of one LTSM 
approach over another?  
In accordance with the suggestion for more qualitative, theory development 
approaches in SSCM (e.g., Carter and Easton, 2011), we conduct abductive multiple case 
studies to answer these questions. To enhance the explanatory power and to support the 
dialogue between research and practice (Pagell and Shevchenko, 2014), we embed our 
findings in Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Ketokivi and Choi, 2014). In addition, this 
study responds to the call for a wider application of TCE (Sarkis et al., 2011) by challenging 
the theory through a revelation of its boundaries when applied to LTSM. 
The study’s contributions are threefold. First, this paper is among the first that 
advances theory development in LTSM by presenting different LTSM categories and 
approaches. Thereby, we complement extant research on LTSM recognizing the importance 
of the diffusion of imitable practices as an alternative to self-centered proprietary efforts 
(Carter et al., 2017), especially when it comes down to handling lower tier suppliers 
characterized by weak ties through so-called arm’s-length collaboration (Kim and Choi, 
2015). Second, the growing field of risk management in SSCM research (cp. Busse et al., 
2017b) is augmented as our results suggest that the perceived sustainability risk (PSR) of 
buying firms influences their choice of LTSM approaches. Third, we enhance managerial 
decision making by providing SCM and procurement professionals with insights regarding 
their firm’s individual PSR profiles and by offering a practical model linking LTSM 
approaches to resource intensity.  
In summary, our findings support buying firms in building trust into the sustainability 
practices across numerous globally dispersed suppliers without engaging in the cost-
prohibitive and ineffective distant monitoring of such complex networks. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the 
study’s conceptual background. Thereafter, the methodological approach and the data are 
presented. Subsequently, in the fourth section the results of the case analyses are shown. 
Finally, this paper concludes with a discussion of theoretical and practical implications, an 
acknowledgement of limitations and suggestions for future research. 
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2. Theoretical background 
2.1 Lower tier sustainability management 
A substantial amount of research has been conducted on SSCM, as is evident in the number of 
literature reviews that have appeared on the topic (e.g., Touboulic and Walker, 2015). 
However, these studies are largely focusing on direct suppliers (Rauer and Kaufmann, 2015). 
Thus, the knowledge of SSCM approaches in lower tiers of supply networks is mainly 
lacking, except for a few recent exemptions (e.g., Dou et al., 2017; Grimm et al., 2016; Mena 
et al., 2013; Tachizawa and Wong, 2014; Wilhelm et al., 2016b). This research gap is 
particularly interesting because the greater part of a supply network’s environmental and 
social burden occurs at supplier sites distant from the buying firm (Grimm et al., 2014). In 
addition, regulations, such as REACH, require firms to obtain sustainability-related 
information from their lower tier suppliers and to manage them (Meinlschmidt et al., 2016). 
Therefore, from a risk and compliance perspective, buying firms should consider extending 
their sustainability strategies and practices to distant tiers further upstream in their supply 
network (Wilhelm et al., 2016a).  
Previous studies have shown that focal firms pursue different sustainability 
approaches, often varying in their intensity (e.g., Grimm et al., 2016). While some buying 
firms interact only with their direct suppliers which act as gatekeepers and help them to 
approach suppliers at distant tiers (Wilhelm et al., 2016a), other firms approach lower tier 
suppliers directly to control and monitor their sustainability performance (e.g., Grimm et al., 
2016). However, the missing direct business relationship with second- or third-tier suppliers 
and the resulting opaque supply network structures often cause information deficits for buyers 
(Busse et al., 2017a). Wilhelm et al. (2016b) investigated multi-tier supply chains in different 
industries with respect to LTSM strategies and their particular contingencies. Their research 
contextualizes the handling of lower tier suppliers characterized by weak ties through so 
called-arm’s length collaboration (Kim and Choi, 2015). In addition, Mena et al. (2013) found 
that institutional distance, horizontal complexity, sustainability capabilities of the direct 
supplier and the topical sustainability focus play important roles in supplier management. 
Grimm et al. (2016) mainly find public attention on the mediating first-tier supplier to drive 
the perceived risk of sub-suppliers’ non-compliance. Moreover, a focal buying firm's channel 
power influences its engagement in sub-supplier management. Only recently – however 
focusing on environmental aspects of sub-supplier management – Dou et al. (2017) 
emphasize top managers’ support and geographic proximity of supply chain members as 
important enablers. Still, deep-level insights on the numerous LTSM approaches available to 
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buying firms and their contextual applications are missing today. 
Since focal buying firms are often only responsible for a small percentage of indirect 
turnovers of lower tier suppliers, they have only limited power to apply captive sourcing 
governance modes and cannot compensate for the lack of direct control through incentives, as 
suggested by TCE (Plambeck et al., 2012). When focal buying firms seek to apply a network-
spanning approach, the opaque network structure requires them to devote more resources to 
identification and auditing mechanisms. Only then, critical lower tier suppliers with poor 
sustainability practices can be either eliminated or supported (Pagell et al., 2010). Therefore, 
decision makers must balance the associated transaction costs in terms of information 
gathering and supplier-auditing capacity (Zsidisin and Siferd, 2001) with the benefits they 
obtain from applying LTSM (Busse et al., 2017a). Such benefits may include higher selling 
prices, risk reduction or winning orders over competitors (Foerstl et al., 2015). TCE considers 
these potential costs, such as reputational damage (e.g., caused by a potential supplier 
scandal) or gaining extra margins (e.g., through distinct sustainability features) as opportunity 
costs. Accordingly, firms will apply LTSM as long as these expected negative opportunity 
costs prevail the costs for LTSM.  
2.2. Transaction Cost Economics 
TCE argues that a firm’s make-or-buy decision is determined not only by the price of the 
purchased item but also its transaction costs (Williamson, 1973). These transaction costs can 
occur ex-ante or ex-post the transaction (Williamson, 2008). Ex-ante costs are typically 
related to information-seeking processes and the negotiation of contractual terms, whereas ex-
post costs primarily stem from monitoring tasks and other processes that target the 
enforcement of contractual agreements (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Accordingly, the 
adequate governance mode for a transaction (i.e., market, hybrid and hierarchy) is the one 
which results in the lowest total costs (Williamson, 1973).  
TCE rests on key assumptions of human behavior (i.e., bounded rationality and 
opportunism) and two main dimensions of transactions (i.e., asset specificity and uncertainty) 
(Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Williamson, 1985). Bounded rationality refers to the undoubted 
fact that decision makers’ cognitive capabilities and rationality are constrained (Rindfleisch 
and Heide, 1997). Opportunism refers to exchanging actors that have a tendency toward self-
seeking interest with guile (Williamson, 1985).  
Consequently, “attenuating the ex post hazards of opportunism through the ex-ante 
choice of governance is central to the transaction cost economics exercise” (Williamson 1998, 
p. 31). Opportunism is particularly problematic when the buyer has no transparency over its 
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upstream supply network. The buyer then faces a safeguarding problem and becomes 
exploitable. Configurations of opportunism together with bounded rationality and the 
following key dimensions of transactions result in different governance modes, which aim at 
attenuating such negative effects (Grover and Malhotra, 2003). For instance, in situations in 
which asset specificity is based on idiosyncratic investments, opportunism becomes an 
important threat. Thus, low degrees of asset specificity should be governed through the 
market, high degrees through hierarchies and medium degrees by hybrid governance modes 
(Williams, 1998). Similar to asset specificity, the configurations and interactions of 
environmental uncertainty (i.e., uncertain environments “in which the circumstances 
surrounding an exchange cannot be specified ex ante” (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997, p. 31)) 
and behavioral uncertainty (i.e., uncertain environments in which “performance cannot be 
easily verified ex post” (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997, p. 31)) require different LTSM 
governance modes.  
Initially, TCE has been widely used to explain sourcing phenomena (Grover and 
Malhotra, 2003) and has also been applied to SSCM research more recently (e.g., Delmas and 
Montiel, 2009). For instance, Simpson et al. (2007) find that asset specificity moderates 
between a supplier’s sustainability commitment and customer pressure for sustainability. 
Other studies found that suppliers are more likely to engage in sustainable business practices 
when information-seeking costs are low (Tate et al., 2014). However, research continues to 
call for more TCE application in future studies (Sarkis et al., 2011). 
Unlike to what TCE proposes, a contractual relation between the focal firm and lower 
tier suppliers is not necessarily given. Therefore, TCE’s initial scope of application is 
surpassed in this study. However, the underlying hypothesis of applying TCE in our research 
context is that – given certain configurations – focal firms are inclined to apply LTSM. 
Otherwise, they would potentially suffer from opportunity costs linked to reputational 
damage, loss of orders, or foregone revenues. Clearly, devoting resources to LTSM is 
associated with transaction costs in terms of identifying (ex ante) and monitoring (ex post) 
critical lower tier suppliers. The TCE perspective enables us to theorize the opportunities and 
risk reduction potential of specific LTSM approaches in conjunction with the costs of 
implementing them, thereby generating relevant managerial insights (Williamson, 1998). 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Research design 
An abductive, multiple case study approach is applied for four reasons. First, prior research 
has encouraged case studies over surveys as the method of choice in SSCM (Carter and 
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Rogers, 2008). Second, there is a limited understanding of how and when firms apply LTSM. 
This requires exploratory theory development to substantiate the constructs and propositions 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Third, utilizing multiple data sources and asking clarification questions 
contributes to higher internal and construct validity through triangulation (Yin, 2003) and 
helps mitigating the social desirability bias (Carter and Easton, 2011). Fourth, due to the 
participation of managers operating in real LTSM situations, we are able to develop and 
elaborate a theory of high relevance to practitioners (Gibbert et al., 2008). 
We applied an abductive theory elaboration approach that “involves modifying the 
logic of the general theory in order to reconcile it with contextual idiosyncrasies” (Ketokivi 
and Choi, 2014, p. 236). Accordingly, TCE exists as a potent lens to guide our exploration, in 
which the research context also plays a significant role in the theorizing process (choice of 
LTSM governance mode). Moreover, abductive theory elaboration is the most appropriate 
method when a priori hypotheses cannot be deduced; as in our case in which contextual 
factors and LTSM approaches were not previously known. Throughout the research process, 
the theoretical perspective augments the understanding of the contextually derived data ex 
post (Ketokivi and Choi, 2014). 
3.2 Sampling 
With the initial sampling of six industries, we sought to purposefully maximize the data 
richness by gaining comprehensive insights from the most interesting cases. To do so, we 
focus on large internationally operating focal firms that are likely to apply LTSM (Bowen, 
2002). To further enhance the generalizability of our results, industries were selected that are 
typically exposed to sustainability challenges: chemicals (Chem), pharmaceuticals (Pharma), 
furniture (Furn), apparel (Appa), packaging (Pack) and semi-conductors (Semi).  
Whereas firms in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries source a high percentage 
of raw materials that are harmful to humans and the natural environment (Christmann, 2000), 
firms that produce furniture (Handfield et al., 1997) and clothing (Yu, 2008) are commonly 
criticized for their suppliers’ pollution of the environment and inhumane labor practices. In 
the packaging industry, firms sell their products to a broad range of buyers from different 
industries and thus must comply with various sustainability demands (Foerstl et al., 2015). 
Moreover, firms that produce semi-conductors face high stakeholder pressure to responsibly 
source raw material to guarantee conflict free mineral supply chains (Hofmann et al., 2015).  
Out of 25 contacted international firms we managed to solicit the cooperation of 
twelve buying firms, two firms from each of these six industries. The sample involves a 
sustainability leader and a follower from the six industries mentioned above (Table 1). 
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Sustainability leaders were identified based on the firms’ listings in sustainability indexes and 
their mentioned sustainability engagement in the media.  
Overall, this sampling approach ensured variance in the dependent and the 
independent variables within and across industries and was assumed to enable the detection of 
different LTSM approaches (Tachizawa and Wong, 2014).  
The final sample includes 53 interviews at twelve firms. Additional interviews outside 
the scope of the here presented cases were conducted. However, it was concluded that 
theoretical saturation (Yin, 2003) was achieved as these cases did not reveal new LTSM 
approaches or drivers.  
----------------------------------- Insert Table 1 approximately here ----------------------------------- 
3.3 Data collection 
As LTSM is cross-functional, informants from the purchasing, quality and sustainability 
department were interviewed in each case. Whenever possible, interviews were jointly 
conducted by two researchers, based on a semi-structured guideline. According to our 
abductive research approach, we used sustainability reports and supplier codes of conduct for 
the preparation of interviews and to inquire how certain practices are being conducted. The 
interviews lasted between 45-150 minutes and were transcribed based on recordings and 
interviewer notes. For triangulation purposed and to ensure reliability and content validity, 
additional documents, such as procurement guidelines, supplier evaluation sheets and publicly 
available sustainability reports were critically analyzed (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
To ensure that new and interesting facets were included in subsequent interviews, we 
adjusted the guideline as necessary (Yin, 2003). Furthermore, we shared the transcripts with 
the informants to verify the accuracy of facts and to ensure reliability (Ellram, 1996). 
Additionally, a case database that incorporates the individual notes, the interview transcripts, 
the content from firm websites, the observation sheets and all the internal and publicly 
available data was established (Yin, 2003). 
3.4 Coding 
The analysis began with an open coding of the interview transcripts to develop a thorough 
understanding of each case’s unique pattern (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Thereafter, the data 
were triangulated with internal purchasing and auditing guidelines to check for consistency of 
statements provided by our informants. Based on this, first-order codes of LTSM approaches 
and their intensity as applied at each firm were extracted in a within-case analysis (Pratt, 
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2009). For brevity reasons, we only present the cross-case findings in the development of our 
research proposition (section 4). The profile of each firm in terms of contextual factors and 
LTSM approaches can be obtained from Table 4 and 5.  
In a next step, axial coding was applied to detect commonalities and differences in 
LTSM approaches across cases (Ellram, 1996; Pratt, 2009), which also led to the distinction 
in proactive, active and reactive LTSM approaches (Figure 1, end of section 4). To manifest 
and complement these relative comparisons, we applied pattern-matching to identify 
contextual factors that explain each firm’s PSR and choice of LTSM approaches (Yin, 2003). 
To theorize our findings, we then reflected the case findings in TCE in order to derive more 
abstract second-order quotes. Accordingly, we structured our findings along the transaction 
cost drivers and the resulting governance modes (Figure 1). This process was non-linear but 
required numerous iterations between data coding and theory elaboration. Thus, the analysis 
revealed the abductive reasoning at a more general level and supported us in developing 
theoretical perspectives on LTSM (Strauss and Corbin, 1990).  
4. Results 
In 4.1, we present eight LTSM approaches that emerged during data analysis. These were 
clustered into three overarching categories according to their resource intensity (Table 2). In 
4.2, we identify six contextual factors that drive a focal firm’s PSR and which are clustered 
according to the TCE dimensions. Finally, we provide insights into how firms chose between 
the available approaches (4.3). 
4.1 LTSM approaches and categories  
The LTSM approaches are presented according to their categories (i.e., direct, indirect, 
neglect); ordered from high to low resource intensity in line with their proactive, active or 
reactive nature (Figure 1). Prior research found that the most resource-intensive approaches 
have also proven to be the most effective in reducing lower tier sustainability risks and in 
enhancing the sustainable product characteristics of the buying firm, thus justifying their 
application in a given context (Williamson, 2008). 
----------------------------------- Insert Table 2 approximately here ----------------------------------- 
4.1.1 Direct LTSM approaches  
In the category of direct LTSM approaches, buying firms directly evaluate, select and develop 
lower tier suppliers using their own resources. Among our sample, four associated approaches 
belonging to the direct category were identified (Table 2).  
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The holistic approach is characterized by the highest resource allocation, since buying 
firms manage their lower tier suppliers regularly. In the case sample, only Appa1 pursued this 
approach. This apparel firm uses a highly forward-thinking, proactive sustainability strategy, 
including an environmental profit and loss accounting method that assesses the environmental 
burden caused throughout its entire upstream supply chain. Therefore, Appa1 seeks 
environmental information from its entire supply network and its evaluation includes third-tier 
suppliers (dye houses and tanneries) on a monthly basis (selects and retains them based on the 
evaluation results and develops them if necessary) as mentioned by its Chief Sourcing 
Officer: “We assessed the environmental and social performance of all our direct and indirect 
suppliers once up to tier-n, which is tier four in our case. We evaluate and develop our tier-2 
and tier-3 suppliers on a regular basis and even indicate to our direct and tier-1 suppliers 
where to source from” (Table 2). The cotton field and cattle farm suppliers on the fourth tier 
were only assessed once to complete Appa1’s picture of the environmental burden within its 
supply chain. However, the firm plans to directly manage these fourth suppliers soon. This 
approach requires the highest resource intensity, yet it also provides firms the greatest 
likelihood of being able to identify and rectify sustainability misconduct in their upstream 
supply chains. Therefore, the holistic approach is effective in exerting control over and 
coordinating the supply chain for sustainability in a proactive manner. 
The product-specific and the region-specific approaches to direct LTSM were found to 
be similar in their logic as buying firms evaluate and develop certain suppliers depending on 
the products they deliver or their locations. The product-specific approach was identified in 
Chem1, Pharma1 and Furn1. Executives of these firms noted that they do not intend to 
manage all their lower tier suppliers regularly. Instead, the executives do so for specific 
products that are considered critical in their peer industries, as confirmed by Chem1: 
“Normally we just control our tier-1 suppliers, but regarding critical products, such as palm-
oil, we control up to tier-n” (Ch1C). Similarly, Pharma1 controls lower tier suppliers that 
deliver certain active pharmaceutical ingredients made under potentially environmentally 
harmful conditions, whereas Furn1 ensures that coated steel from lower tier suppliers does 
not contain toxic lubricants (Table 2). Similarly, the region-specific approach is selectively 
applied to suppliers that are based in regions in which environmental misconduct and labor 
standards violations are assumed: “In specific regions, such as Asia, we audit certain second-
tier suppliers when we suspect non-compliance with labor standards” (Ph1C). In addition to 
Asian lower tier suppliers, Chem1 also applies this approach, if suppliers are located in South 
America. Due to their selective application to lower tier suppliers, the product- and region-
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specific approaches are often applied in combination (Chem1 and Pharma1). The use of these 
approaches requires fewer resources than the previously noted holistic approach. As it is 
recurrently applied by our cases it is considered an active approach. However, across cases we 
find that these approaches are less effective in identifying and rectifying sustainability 
misconduct at lower tier suppliers compared to the holistic approach, which is also consistent 
with recent findings (Busse et al., 2017).  
The last approach in the category of direct LTSM is the event-specific approach is 
considered a reactive measure. The approach enables firms to apply LTSM by utilizing their 
own resources when facing certain critical and urgent events, such as the detected or 
suspected non-compliance of a lower tier supplier, as was observed at Pharma2: “We were 
informed by an NGO that children collect raw materials in fields at an Indian lower tier 
supplier. We had to implement supplier development programs and to modify our supply 
chain to solve this problem” (Ph2C). At Furn1, LTSM activities were identified as a 
consequence of a major customer order that required detailed information regarding the 
product’s and upstream supply chain’s environmental characteristics (Table 2). In applying 
this approach, focal firms do not proactively engage in identifying critical lower tier suppliers. 
Instead, the firms only conduct audits and rectify misconduct at second- or third-tiers that 
have been identified as or suspected to be critical. Therefore, the required resource investment 
is the lowest among the four identified direct approaches. However, this approach is also the 
least effective in continuously and proactively preventing misconduct in this category.  
4.1.2 Indirect LTSM approaches 
Indirect LTSM approaches are characterized by indirectly evaluating, selecting and 
developing lower tier suppliers through relational and cooperative governance modes. This 
category of LTSM approach can be considered a hybrid (Williamson, 2008), since firms 
manage lower tier suppliers with own and foreign resources. 
The multiplier-based approach is characterized by focal firms managing their direct 
suppliers in special projects for sustainability. In turn, these suppliers commit themselves to 
manage their own suppliers based on equally strict standards in a proactive manner. This 
approach was observed at Chem1, as stated in its sustainability report: “We form a team of 
three suppliers, with the aim of promoting CSR and giving guidance in the form of best 
practices and customized solutions along our supply chain. Each of the three partners then 
introduces the same concept to three further business partners in its own supply chain.” This 
approach is highly efficient and entails advantages for both parties. The direct supplier 
receives knowledge and shares its sustainability capability beyond the ordinary scope of 
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commitment with distant tiers (Table 2). By applying this approach, the buying firm creates a 
“multiplier effect” throughout its supply network and ensures compliance with its supplier 
code of conduct among lower tier suppliers. Therefore, the resource dedication is considered 
low compared to its effectiveness in reducing sustainability-related risks and leveraging 
sustainable product characteristics. 
An alliance-based approach was also found to enable indirect LTSM. This approach 
includes mechanisms in which buying firms participate in sustainability-related alliances and 
industry consortia (e.g., Together for Sustainability and Pharmaceutical Supply Chain 
Initiative). Nearly all companies are active members of at least one such alliance and 
consortia or co-founded them. Such memberships enable firms to indirectly ensure 
sustainability standards at lower tier suppliers as several of these alliances use independent 
service providers to control compliance at sites, while others enable firms to exchange audit 
information obtained from lower tier suppliers on a recurring basis (Table 2). The required 
resource allocation in this active approach is lower than in the multiplier-based approach as 
the former does not necessarily require the buying firm to engage in direct supplier 
development activities. The approach’s effectiveness is comparatively high since lower tier 
supplier compliance is achieved through independent audits according to a widespread 
industry standard. However, this LTSM approach requires prior identification of critical lower 
tier suppliers. In this context, firms applying indirect LTSM approaches have entire 
departments dedicated to stakeholder and sustainability-alliance interaction.  
Last, a compliance-based approach was observed. Often, in their supplier codes of 
conduct, focal firms demand that direct suppliers apply the same sustainability requirements 
to their own suppliers (Schleper and Busse, 2013). Except for Furn2, all cases apply this 
approach, as stated in Pack2’s supplier code of conduct: “We encourage our suppliers to 
procure raw materials and services in an ethical manner that supports sustainable business 
practices.” Nearly all firms included such a passage; however, they admitted that they do not 
actively control whether their direct suppliers manage all their suppliers for sustainability, but 
use them as reactive assurance against acusations (Table 2). Therefore, such compliance-
based instruments have not yielded the expected effects in improving sustainability (Lund-
Thomsen and Lindgreen, 2014). Instead, without enforcement and engagement in substantial 
action, this approach must be considered a symbolic act; this is often also regarded as 
“greenwashing” (Blome et al., 2017).  
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4.1.3 The neglect approach 
Furn2 is the sole firm that does not engage in LTSM. Given that the firm does not engage in 
interaction beyond tier-one suppliers, it solely relies on market-based governance according to 
TCE (Williamson, 2008).  
4.2 Perceived sustainability risk 
Sustainability risks are an important sub-topic in SSCM research (e.g., Foerstl et al., 2010; 
Hofmann et al., 2014). How much risk an organization perceives is a matter of a firm’s 
individual characteristics as it faces external uncertainty with imperfect knowledge regarding 
the probability and severity of risks (Mitchell, 1995). Accordingly, the level of PSR is 
subjective and differs from firm to firm. In accordance with the prior research (e.g., Busse et 
al., 2017b), in this study, we refer to the “perceived sustainability risk” as an individual 
buying firm’s perception of how likely it is that (i) a negative sustainability-related condition 
or event occurs within the supply network, (ii) stakeholders take note of this condition or 
event, (iii) stakeholders ascribe responsibility to the buying firm for being capable of 
preventing such negative incidents or conditions and (iv) stakeholders subsequently determine 
to punish the buying firm.  
During the interviews, PSR emerged as the pivotal concept and the driver of why 
LTSM is pursued at all (see Table 3). Due to the introductory, prominent negative examples 
in which sustainability risk was manifested and focal buying firms suffered from adverse 
stakeholder reactions, a high sensitivity to sustainability-related risks exists, as demonstrated 
by Chem1, which remarked that “the big challenge that we face is that we cannot control all 
practices and provided data; there are just too many sub-suppliers that we would need to 
process, but we have to get started to reduce our exposure to those risks” (Ch1C). This is in 
line with prior research that emphasized the influence of sustainability risks on sub-supplier 
management practiced (e.g., Grimm et al., 2016). Subsequently, we present the factors that 
determine a focal firm’s PSR and, thus, their choice of LTSM approaches and mechanisms 
(Figure 1) 
----------------------------------- Insert Table 3 approximately here ----------------------------------- 
4.3 Contextual factors 
Six contextual variables that drive a focal firm’s PSR and, in turn, increase the need to LTSM 
were identified (Table 4). According to the theoretical framework, these underlying 
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contextual factors are clustered along the three dimensions of TCE: environmental 
uncertainty, behavioral uncertainty and asset specificity.  
----------------------------------- Insert Table 4 approximately here ----------------------------------- 
4.3.1 Environmental uncertainty 
Throughout the interviews, stakeholder salience was identified as a crucial factor for 
uncertainty in a focal firm’s environment. Several firms affirmed that they are driven by these 
stakeholders in pursuing LTSM (Table 3 & 4). Particularly consumers and customers 
represent powerful stakeholder groups because they pose the risk of boycotts, reputational 
damage and a subsequent loss of sales (Busse et al., 2017b). Semi1 explained: “Our customers 
from the consumer electronics industry push us to implement sustainable procurement 
practices even with our sub-suppliers” (Se1D). In addition to customers and consumers, NGOs, 
unions and the media often pressure buying firms to apply LTSM, as the introductory 
example of child labor has shown. Although these stakeholders are not in any contractual 
relationship to the buying firm, they are powerful actors that advocate on behalf of weaker 
stakeholders such as exploited children who are deprived of their legitimate and urgent 
claims. Among the firms studied, the most pressing example occurred at Pharma2, which was 
informed by an NGO that children were working at one of its lower tier suppliers. Pharma2 
immediately reacted to this urgent claim by applying direct development activities to this sub-
supplier to rectify this severe misconduct.  
Prior research has emphasized the influence of stakeholder pressure on the adoption of 
SSCM practices by firms as an important aspect (e.g., Parmigiani et al., 2011). In accordance 
with Mitchell et al.’s (1997) theory of stakeholder salience, which transcends mere 
stakeholder pressure, three different attributes influence how salient stakeholders are 
perceived by managers: their power, the legitimacy of their claims and the urgency associated 
with these claims (Table 4). Thus, together the case examples reveal the influence of 
‘stakeholder chains’ on focal buying firms’ PSR (Busse et al., 2017b) in a way that the larger 
the number of Mitchell et al.’s (1997) three characteristics is combined in a stakeholder, the 
higher its salience for our case firms. Therefore, the following is proposed:  
P1: The higher the stakeholder salience in terms of power, legitimacy and urgency, the 
higher the buying firm’s PSR. 
A focal firm’s structural supply network complexity emerged from the data as the 
second contextual variable. Whereas the vertical and horizontal complexity are influenced by 
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the number of upstream tiers and the suppliers at the same tier level, the spatial complexity 
refers to the dispersion of tiers among different countries and locations (Table 4). In 
accordance with prior research, the term is defined as the overall degree of the vertical, 
horizontal and spatial complexity (Choi and Hong, 2002).  
In our sample, firms from the chemical, pharmacy and apparel industries exhibit a 
high structural supply network complexity of a maximum of four tiers. The managers at these 
firms acknowledged a high PSR as sustainability-related uncertainty arises from a large 
number of lower tier suppliers (Table 4). This higher complexity results in less visibility and 
higher uncertainty regarding lower tier supplier’s sustainability conduct as expressed by one 
interviewee: “We have a verification problem in our supply network if we want to evaluate 
beyond first-tier suppliers that requires effort to generate transparency of second-tier suppliers 
and beyond (W1B).” Firms from the furniture, packaging and electronic industries indicated 
less need to apply LTSM. These firms are located further upstream, they must only apply 
LTSM at a two tier levels, in contrast to Furn1 and Furn2, which are major buying firms. 
This finding is in line with recent research that found that the higher the structural 
supply chain complexity is, the higher the probability that buying firms lack sufficient 
knowledge of their lower tier suppliers (Busse et al., 2017b; Carter et al., 2015; Grimm et al., 
2016). Horizontal complexity in particular is a main contingency for the LTSM strategy of 
focal buying firms (Wilhelm et al., 2016b). Therefore, the following is proposed: 
P2: The higher a buying firm’s structural supply network complexity is, the higher its 
PSR. 
Given the environmental uncertainty, a product’s and an industry’s salience to end 
customers is conjectured to also influence a focal buying firm’s PSR. Among our cases, the 
products of Pharma1, Pharma2, Furn1, Furn2, Appa1 and Appa2 are directly sold to end 
customers and thus highly visible in the marketplace. Executives stated that their firms feel 
pressured from NGOs and end consumers to apply LTSM. Chem1, Chem2, Pack1, Pack2, 
Semi1 and Semi2 sell their products exclusively in business-to-business contexts, therefore 
perceiving less pressure (Table 4). However, Chem1 (which is listed in the German stock 
index DAX 30) and Pack1 (which promotes its products prominently on television) indicated 
higher pressure for sustainable conduct in their respective supply networks: “We must have a 
clear view of what is going on at the second- and third-tier suppliers and that is why we seek 
to increase transparency through sub-supplier audits” (Se1C). 
  15 
Previous research suggests that firms selling highly visible products to the public must 
place greater emphasis on SSCM (Schneider and Wallenburg, 2012). Furthermore, 
Hajmohammad and Vachon (2016) emphasize that PSR is entangled with the visibility of the 
focal firm’s industry and its position in the market. The prior research has found that firms 
that lack publicly known brand names wait longer to apply SSCM (Simpson et al., 2012) as 
they feel less pressured to do so (Foerstl et al., 2015) as has been the case for Chem2, Pack2, 
Semi1 and Semi2 (Table 4). Moreover, visibility is also a function of potential harm caused to 
the environment in the event of sustainability failures (Mena et al., 2013). Furthermore, 
industries in which manual, low skilled labor demand to produce the product is high are 
opposed to the higher risk of labor discrimination and exploitation (Simpson et al., 2012). 
To summarize, our data supports that critical materials and the visibility of products 
influence the intensity of LTSM, which is also supported by recent findings where public 
attention was found to be critical (Grimm et al., 2016). Thus, we propose: 
P3: The higher the product and industry salience linked to the buying firm are, the 
higher its PSR. 
4.3.2 Behavioral uncertainty 
With respect to behavioral uncertainty, the occurrence of past sustainability-related incidents 
in the focal firm’s supply base and/or its peer industry increased the PSR of the sample 
companies. Additionally, buying firms that experienced sustainability-related problems at its 
own premises or/and the premises of a competitor may have analyzed and reflected on these 
problems, thus creating an intensified awareness and risk perception with respect to future 
problems of this type (Table 3 & 4). Pharma2 explained that perception “was informed by an 
NGO that children were collecting raw material in fields at an Indian sub-supplier” (B2D). 
Based on this information, the company immediately applied its supplier development 
initiatives to this sub-supplier. Moreover, this incident tipped the balance for a focus on 
LTSM in that particular region. A similar case was reported by Pack1. The firm branded its 
products with the FSC label and when it was accused of working with a non-FSC-compliant 
forestry business, it immediately developed product-specific initiatives to ensure compliance 
across its affected supply base. 
Further, the two apparel firms (Appa1 and Appa2) drastically changed their buying 
behavior as a reaction to the preceding sustainability scandal in the supply network of their 
main competitor in the early 1990s. After this incident, Appa1’s and Appa2’s practices 
changed from a reactive, occasionally neglectful approach to a proactive, transparency-
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seeking one. Appa1’s Chief Sourcing Officer even explained to us that “We re-designed the 
supply chain in the 1990s in South East Asia in order not to face the same trouble that [one of 
their main competitors] had”. Similar processes occurred at Semi1 and Semi2 when one of 
their main customers found itself pressured to disclose its supply chain to improve worker 
conditions at suppliers. In the sample, it became clear that firms that had experienced such 
incidents perceived a higher level of PSR and therefore engaged in more intense practices 
than firms that did not (Chem2, Furn2, Pack1 and Pack2).  
Also, extant supply chain risk management literature suggests that past experience 
with supplier misconduct and disruption within the own supply network and/or the supply 
network of a competitor is suggested to change recent risk perceptions and thus the preventive 
approaches for the near future (Groetsch et al., 2013). Hence, we propose: 
P4: The higher the severity and frequency of past incidents in the focal firm’s and/or a 
competitor’s supply network is, the higher the focal firm’s PSR. 
The socio-economic and cultural distance between a buying firm and its lower tier suppliers 
was extracted as an additional contextual factor. At Appa2, it is believed that such differences 
drove their PSR and thus their LTSM approaches: “Major challenges for us are the cultural 
and regulatory differences between western European countries and emerging markets, such 
as China” (Ap2A). In addition, B2C indicated that “it is absolutely essential that we meet our 
suppliers and their sub-supplier in the region; otherwise their commitment towards us is low”.  
Only Furn1 and Pack2, whose supply bases are regionally concentrated in Western Europe, 
did not note this factor as part of their LTSM considerations (Table 4). 
Previous research found cultural differences to be important in inter-firm relationships 
and global contexts with respect to supplier sustainability practices (e.g., Hofstede, 1980). 
Specifically in the TCE context, Luo (2007) finds that interaction with distant and different 
cultures is linked to higher levels of opportunistic behavior. Thus, socio-economic and 
cultural distant lower tier suppliers are expected to increase behavioral uncertainty as their 
performance is more likely to deviate from the focal firm’s sustainability expectations and 
also more difficult to verify (Hofmann et al., 2015). This finding is supported by Bhagat et al. 
(2002) who suggests that a lack of respect for cultural background may often result in 
challenges in the collaboration between actors. Thus, the following is proposed:  
P5: The higher the socio-economic and cultural distance between the focal firm and its 
major direct suppliers is, the higher its PSR. 
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4.3.3 Asset specificity 
Related to the asset specificity TCE category, the lower tier supplier dependency was found to 
be an important and variable factor. For instance, whereas Pharma1 and Semi1 exhibit high 
levels of dependence on their lower tier suppliers, Chem1, Chem2, Pharma2, Furn1, Pack1 
and Semi2 exhibit medium levels of dependence. In contrast, the remaining four firms (Furn2, 
Appa1, Appa2 and Pack2) display low levels of lower tier supplier dependency. Across cases 
it was expressed that similar to dependence on direct suppliers, it is difficult if not impossible 
to switch to competitors in these scenarios (Table 3 and 4). The two cases from the electronics 
industry stressed that for example the tsunami, nuclear and social catastrophe in the 
Fukushima region in 2011 demonstrated the problem of important but to this point invisible 
lower tier suppliers that were affected by the disaster. This idea is supported by Pharma2: 
“Dropping or shifting suppliers is not an option in many cases [in this case, specialty raw 
materials and chemicals] due to the high market concentration” (Ph2C). Consequently, 
Pharma2 and others, such as Chem1, Pharma1 and Semi1, first attempt to create transparency 
in the supply base for these product groups and then conduct audits at the lower tier supplier 
levels that are most important and that one is most dependent on. Moreover, as Appa1 
launched its sustainable product line, it became more dependent on the sustainability conduct 
of the specific lower tier raw material and direct component suppliers (Table 4). 
Prior research found different distributions of power ranging from buyer dominance 
over interdependencies to supplier dominance as important aspects in the context of ethical 
and social responsible behavior (e.g., Schleper et al., 2017). When buying firms have a strong 
bargaining position in the supply network (i.e., less dependency), they have greater leverage 
in implementing and managing sustainability-related practices at lower tier suppliers and they 
demand propagation from the direct supplier (Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen, 2009). Buying 
firms that face these dependencies lack risk diversification, or back-up options and can thus 
be exploited by suppliers (Schleper et al., 2017). Furthermore, Hajmohammad and Vachon 
(2016) find that buyer-sub-supplier dependence influences a buying firm’s sustainability risk 
management perception. Thus, in line with extant literature the following is proposed: 
P6: The higher the focal firm’s dependency on its lower tier suppliers, the higher its 
PSR. 
4.4 Choice of LTSM approach 
The above identified direct and indirect LTSM approaches require different levels of resource 
allocation and exhibit different degrees of effectiveness. The PSR of firms plays a major role 
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in their choice of LTSM approaches, which is driven by the contextual variables and their 
underlying factors (Table 4). As a result, the case companies apply a combination of (in-) 
direct LTSM approaches with varying (Table 5). The following section compares the firms in 
terms of their PSR level and applied approaches. 
----------------------------------- Insert Table 5 approximately here ----------------------------------- 
In the sample, Chem1, Pharma1 and Appa1 encounter high PSR, as illustrated by, on 
average, high degrees of each individual contextual factor (Table 4). While, these firms apply 
indirect approaches at high levels, they additionally pursue direct LTSM approaches with high 
intensity, which are the most resource-intensive but also the most effective cooperative 
governance approaches to LTSM (Table 5). Chem2, Pharma2, Furn1 and Appa2 show high 
levels of PSR and engage in some direct, but predominantly indirect LTSM approaches, 
which require fewer resources but which are also less effective. Furn2, Pack1 and Semi1 
experience medium levels of PSR, whereas Pack2 and Semi2 experience low levels. 
Therefore, these firms mainly chose indirect LTSM approaches, which require the fewest 
focal firm resources and which rely on market-based governance to provide effective 
sustainability at the lower tier supplier level. These findings are in accordance with the prior 
literature, which suggests that focal firms that face high uncertainty regarding their networks’ 
sustainability conduct and hence have a higher PSR are more likely to vertically integrate or 
to apply coordinating hybrid governance mechanisms (Carter and Rogers, 2008).  
Hitherto, direct LTSM engagement has not been in the predictive scope of TCE, which 
traditionally focused on make or buy decisions (Williamson, 2008). Once the buy decision has 
been made, reliance on market mechanisms would be the LTSM approach of choice. 
However, not applying LTSM under high PSR leads to high expected opportunity costs such 
as reputational damage, financial loss and loss of orders. As LTSM is associated with 
transaction costs in terms of identifying (ex ante) and monitoring and controlling critical 
lower tier suppliers (ex post), we expect focal firms to choose the approach that effectively 
reduces expected opportunity costs at the lowest available transaction costs (Williamson, 
2008). Transaction costs were coded as the resource intensity of the respective approaches. If 
a focal firm faces high PSR, resource-intensive LTSM approaches are therefore justified 
through high expected opportunity costs. In turn, these in-house governance approaches are 
highly effective in ensuring sustainability conduct among the firm’s lower tier suppliers. 
Hence, the following is proposed: 
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P7: The higher the focal firm’s PSR is, the more likely the firm will choose resource-
intensive LTSM approaches. 
Figure 1 presents an overview of the final conceptual framework. 
----------------------------------- Insert Figure 1 approximately here ----------------------------------- 
5. Discussion 
Prior research highlighted the importance for focal firms of extending sustainability to their 
lower tier suppliers (Wilhelm et al., 2016b). However, the literature reports that few buying 
firms apply genuine LTSM approaches, because these are time-consuming and costly (Grimm 
et al., 2014). Moreover, a strong resource commitment toward indirect business partners must 
be considered. Such action is partly in conflict with the traditional recommendations of TCE 
in order to determine the boundaries of the firm. To provide answers regarding the contextual 
variables that drive PSR and to delineate TCE within the lower tier supplier context, an 
abductive, multiple case study approach was applied. This approach allowed us to make 
predictions concerning the choice of LTSM approaches based on the observed PSR factors 
and to provide several theoretical and practical contributions. 
5.1 Theoretical contributions 
This study responds to the plea for more theory-grounded research in SSCM by numerous 
means (Pagell and Shevchenko, 2014). First, as an established theory in SCM (Delmas and 
Montiel, 2009; Tate et al., 2011), TCE was applied as a theoretical foundation to frame 
empirical observations and to explain the findings on choosing among LTSM approaches 
(Carter and Easton, 2011; Sarkis et al., 2011). While most procurement research applied TCE 
to direct buyer-supplier relations (Spina et al., 2016), we extended the application of TCE to 
the buyer-lower tier supplier relationship. Hence, we are extending the application of TCE 
from dyadic make-or-buy decisions towards mediated relations of lower and distant tier 
suppliers. With this research, we demonstrate the ability of TCE to predict the relational 
governance choices to assure compliance with green and social standard of the buying firm at 
indirect business partners. As a result, the traditional perspective on the boundaries of the firm 
is challenged as this study identifies the reasons why the firm’s boundaries may shift toward 
cooperative-hybrid or even hierarchical governance mechanisms when enforcing 
sustainability standards at lower tier suppliers. 
In addition, LTSM enables buying firms to differentiate themselves from competitors, 
win additional orders and/or charge a higher selling price. The risk and the chance 
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perspectives are integrated in the opportunity-cost-based reasoning. Thus, this study adds to 
the previous research, which has primarily concentrated on risk-mitigation approaches in the 
analysis of LTSM (Foerstl et al., 2010; Hofmann et al., 2014). It provides further insights on 
this topic by discussing different opportunity costs and benefits and balancing them with the 
transaction costs associated with LTSM.  
Finally, this study discusses the effectiveness of different approaches. Regarding the 
indirect approach, the focal firms admitted that they do not actively control whether their 
direct suppliers control their own lower tier suppliers, as required in the buying firms’ 
supplier code of conduct. Recent research has shown that, under specific circumstances, 
buying firms must apply LTSM in such a manner that they subsequently change from 
compliance- to commitment-based approaches and directly pass on sustainability 
requirements to lower tier suppliers further upstream (Foerstl et al., 2015). Therefore, the 
alliance-based LTSM approach is preferred to the compliance-based one since the mutually 
agreed certifications and auditing standards of common suppliers reduce the transaction costs 
for both focal firms and lower tier suppliers (Tate et al., 2011).  
5.2 Managerial implications 
This study provides valuable managerial insights. First, firm executives are advised how to 
respond to increasing stakeholder pressure regarding environmental and social conduct in 
their supply networks. Based on the identified approaches, managers can better embrace 
stakeholder demands and transform them into meaningful and true SSCM projects rather than 
considering them an additional cost (Gold and Schleper, 2017; Pagell and Shevchenko, 2014). 
Specifically, this study provides managers with a practical approach to estimate their 
firm-specific PSR. This is in line with prior studies which also emphasize the PSR as a main 
driver and which recommend managers to particularly focus on risk-related indicators in 
sustainability management contexts (e.g., Busse et al., 2017b; Hajmohammad and Vachon, 
2016). Based on the PSR factors, firms obtain a usable and measurable proxy for the expected 
opportunity costs of not responding to the TCE-grounded drivers. In corporate practice, an 
exact assessment would require a highly reliable prediction of future outcomes and their 
financial impact on the buying firm, which is impossible given the bounded rationality of 
managers. Thus, this approach is more viable and exercisable than a numerical prediction. 
With our model, we propose consequential actions to be taken by managers that are 
economically viable given their PSR profile. Referring to Hajmohammad and Vachon (2016, 
p. 59), a first step to use this knowledge might result in the development of purchasing 
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procedures and policies “that facilitate supply managers’ translation of the information 
available to them into accurate risk assessments”.  
Next, practitioners can utilize the suggestion in choosing a set of approaches that 
match their individual PSR (i.e., opportunity costs) to effectively counter these risks and 
opportunities at the lowest possible transaction costs. Hence, the model provides managers 
with a better practically applicable concept than the theoretical ex ante assessment of all 
future opportunity and transaction costs, which are typically not retrievable in standard cost 
accounting or management accounting logic. Moreover, the trade-of logic proclaimed by TCE 
seems more comprehensible to managers than other more abstract theoretical perspectives 
such as network theory, which would also fit to the research context of LTSM.  
6. Conclusions 
As most of the environmental and social burden is caused in lower tiers of supply networks, 
focal buying firms rely on an enriched bouquet of LTSM approaches in order to effectively 
tackle their sustainability iceberg. This study provides eight approaches to sustainable LTSM 
grouped into three categories: direct–in-house (holistic, product-, region-, and event-specific), 
indirect– hybrid (multiplier-, alliance-, and compliance-based) and neglect–market (tier-1-
based) (summarized in Figure 1). Focal firms choose between these different approaches 
depending on the strength of observed contextual factors which are stakeholder salience, 
structural supply network complexity, product and industry salience, past supply base 
incidents, socio-economic and cultural distance and lower tier supplier dependency, leading to 
perceived sustainability risk (PSR).  
To elaborate theory of LTSM, an abductive multiple case study approach was applied. 
Although this method facilitated high internal validity and triangulation, it has inherent 
limitations, such as low external validity. Therefore, future research should test and refine the 
propositions using a large-scale survey to validate the generalizability of the results and 
possibly incorporate additional aspects. Such research could also geographically expand the 
knowledge and study how buying firms from other developed and, in particular, emerging 
economies determine their LTSM approaches. Further studies should use a longitudinal study 
to verify the observations, since PSR profiles develop over time as contextual variables 
change. Additionally, future research should study LTSM at the purchasing category level to 
compare and contrast PSR risk profiles for different purchasing tasks. With the transaction as 
the unit of analysis, one is able to delineate which LTSM approaches are effective responses 
to a specific contextual PSR factor. In this pursuit, further studies should also extend beyond 
the focal buying firm as the prime observational unit of analysis and study the perspective of 
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direct suppliers and the lower tier suppliers on LTSM (Wilhelm, 2011). With regard to our 
sampling approach, the variety in our cases could pose a limitation as it might obscure a more 
nuanced and deep-level exploration of LTSM approaches and contextual factors due to the 
limited comparability across industries. 
Finally, in contrast to what TCE proposes, a contractual relation between the focal 
firm and its lower tier supplier is not necessarily a given in the sample. Therefore, TCE’s 
initial application is surpassed in this study. However, the underlying hypothesis of applying 
TCE in the research context is that, given certain configurations, focal firms are inclined to 
apply LTSM. Otherwise, the firms would potentially suffer from opportunity costs linked to 
reputational damage, loss of orders, or foregone revenues compared with competitors that 
offer truly sustainable commodities while they do not. Clearly, devoting resources to LTSM is 
associated with transaction costs in terms of identifying (ex ante) and monitoring (ex post) 
critical lower tier suppliers. Thus, TCE logic enables one to theorize the opportunities and risk 
reduction potential of specific LTSM approaches in conjunction with the costs of 
implementing them, thereby generating relevant and managerially applicable insights. 
However, there might be other interesting and fruitful theoretical lenses (e.g., institutional 
theory or network theory) through which LTSM phenomena could be analyzed. 
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Chem1 > 110,000 > € 70 Bio. Standard and 
fine chemicals, 
plastics, oil and 
gas 
Ch1A Director Global Sourcing SR, SCoC SSA, AG - Directly evaluate, select and develop 
indirect suppliers dependent on its 
region and the purchased product 
- Indirectly evaluate, select and develop 
indirect suppliers based on projects, 
the membership in sustainability 
alliances, stakeholder information and 
regulative instruments 
Ch1B Manager Purchasing Category 1 
Ch1C Head Sustainable Procurement 
Ch1D Manager Sustainable Procurement 
Ch1E Specialist Sustainable Procurement 
Ch1F Specialist REACH 
Ch1G Head Product Safety 
Ch1H Manager Purchasing Category 2 
Ch1I Head Business Development  
Chem2 > 20,000 > € 6 Bio. Standard and 
fine chemicals, 
plastics, oil and  
gas 
Ch2A Chief Procurement Officer SR, SCoC SSA - Indirectly evaluate, select and develop 
indirect suppliers based on regulative 
instruments 
Ch2B Head Procurement Strategy 
Ch2C Head Global Compliance 
Ch2D Head REACH Procurement 
Ch2E Manager Procurement Indirect Spent 
Ch2F Head Process Management 
Pharma1 > 130,000 > € 40 Bio. Patented and  
non-patented  
medicaments 
Ph1A Head Global Sourcing SR, SCoC SSA, AG - Directly evaluate, select and develop 
indirect suppliers dependent on its 
region and the purchased product 
- Indirectly evaluate, select and develop 
indirect suppliers based on projects, 
the membership in sustainability 
alliances, stakeholder information and 
regulative instruments 
Ph1B Project Adviser Sustainable Sourcing 
Ph1C Head Responsible Procurement 
Ph1D Division Manager Responsible 
Procurement 
Ph1E Head Third Party Operations Active 
Pharmaceutical Ingredients 
Pharma2 > 35,000 > € 10 Bio. Patented and  
non-patented  
medicaments 
Ph2A Manager Sustainable Procurement SR, SCoC SSA - Indirectly evaluate, select and develop 
indirect suppliers based on stakeholder 
information and regulative instruments 
Ph2B Manager Corporate Purchasing 
Ph2C Associate Director Group 
Procurement 
Ph2D Director CSR 
Ph2E Director Occupational Safety 




Fu1A Chief Executive Officer Sustain-
ability 
brochure 
SSA, AG - Directly evaluate, select and develop 
indirect suppliers dependent on the 
purchased product 
- Indirectly evaluate, select and develop 
indirect suppliers based on stakeholder 
Fu1B Head Strategic Sourcing 
Fu1C Head Environmental Management 
Fu1D Project Manager Ergonomics 
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information and regulative instrument 




Fu2A Regional Senior Buyer None AG - Directly and indirectly evaluate, select 
and develop only direct suppliers Fu2B Corporate Senior Buyer Plastics 
Fu2C Corporate Senior Buyer Timber 
Fu2D Head Environmental Management  
Fu2E Head Occupational Health and Safety 
Appa1 > 10,000 > € 3 Bio. Sports- and 
fashion-wear 
Ap1A Chief Sourcing Officer SR, SCoC SSA, AG - Directly evaluate, select and develop 
all indirect suppliers 
- Indirectly evaluate, select and develop 
indirect suppliers based on the 
membership in sustainability alliances 
and regulative instruments  
Ap1B Head Project Management Sourcing 
Ap1C Global Director Social 
Accountability and Environmental 
Standards 
Ap1D Strategic Compliance Officer 
Ap1E Specialist Project Management 
Sourcing 
Appa2 > 1,500 > € 400 
Mio. 
Lifestyle- and  
fashion-wear 
Ap2A Strategic Sustainability Coordinator SR None - Indirectly evaluate, select and develop 
indirect suppliers based on the 
membership in sustainability alliances 
and regulative instruments 
Ap2B Head Strategic Sustainability 
Ap2C Specialist Sustainability Strategy 
Ap2D Specialist Corporate Sustainability 
Pack1 > 20,000 > € 8 Bio. Food packaging, 
cardboard 
boxes 
Pa1A Technical Marketing Manager 
Europe 
SR, SCoC Purchasing 
guideline 
- Indirectly evaluate, select and develop 
indirect suppliers based on the 
membership in sustainability alliances Pa1B Procurement Category Manager 
Pack2 > 10,000 ~ € 3 Bio. Steel and plastic  
containers 
Pa2A Manager Sales and Marketing SR, SCoC None - Indirectly evaluate, select and develop 
indirect suppliers based on regulative 
instruments 
Pa2B Supply Chain Manager 
Semi1 > 30,000 
 




Se1A Supply Chain Director SR, SCoC SSA, 
supplier 
scorecard  
- Indirectly evaluate, select and develop 
indirect suppliers based on the 
membership in sustainability alliances 
and regulative instruments 
Se1B Sales/Marketing Director 
Se1C Purchasing Director 
Se1D Sustainability Director 




Se2A Chief Purchasing Officer SR, SCoC Purchasing 
handbook 
- Indirectly evaluate, select and develop 
indirect suppliers based on the 
membership in sustainability alliances 
and regulative instruments 
Se2B Head of Sales and Operations Europe 
Notes: AG = Audit guideline; SCoC = Supplier Code of Conduct; SR = Sustainability report; SSA = Supplier self-assessment 
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Table 1: Case firm and interviewee demographics  
 
LTSM approach (definition) Representative quotation 
Direct 
Holistic (all lower tiers) “We assessed the environmental and social performance of all our direct and indirect suppliers once up to tier-n, which is tier four 
in our case. We evaluate and develop our tier-2 and tier-3 suppliers on a regular basis and even indicate to our direct and tier-1 
suppliers where to source from.” Appa1, Chief Sourcing Officer 
Product-specific (lower tiers 
dependent on the product that the 
respective supplier delivers) 
“Normally we just control our tier-1 suppliers, but regarding critical products such as palm-oil, we control up to tier-n.” Chem1, 
Head Sustainable Procurement. 
“Normally we just control suppliers from which we directly source. Regarding certain products such as steel, we assess one tier 
further up, as we are concerned about waste water and toxic coatings.” Furn1, Head Environmental Management 
Region-specific (lower tiers 
dependent on the region that the 
respective supplier is from) 
“It is difficult to audit indirect suppliers, as we do not have a business relation with them. However, in specific regions such as 
Asia, we audit certain tier-2 suppliers when we suspect non-compliance to labor standards.” Pharma1, Head Responsible 
Procurement 
Event-specific (lower tiers if non-
compliance is suspected or 
detected) 
“We were informed by an NGO that children collect raw material in fields at an Indian sub-supplier. We had to implement 
ongoing supplier development programs and modify our supply chain to solve this problem.” Pharma2, Associate Director Group 
Procurement 
Indirect 
Multiplier-based (certain direct 
suppliers by enabling them to 
evaluate, select and develop their 
own suppliers) 
“We form a team with three suppliers, with the aim of promoting CSR and giving guidance in the form of best practices and 
customized solutions along our supply chain. The three partners then each introduce the same concept to three additional business 
partners in their own supply chain.” Chem1, Sustainability Report 
Alliance-based (evaluate, select 
and develop lower tiers based on 
membership in industry & 
sustainability alliances) 
“The majority of our suppliers are certified according to independent standards such as FSC. Monitoring is executed by external 
auditors who ensure compliance with the certification criteria down to the raw-material level of our supply chain.” Pack1, 
Procurement Category Manager  
Compliance-based (obligate all 
direct suppliers via regulative 
instruments to evaluate, select and 
develop their own suppliers) 
“We require our suppliers and, in turn, their suppliers to comply with the terms and regulations signed in this document.” Chem2, 
Supplier Code of Conduct.  
“Suppliers shall exercise the source and chain of custody of the minerals tantalum, tin, tungsten and gold and make their due 
diligence measures available to customers upon customer request.” Semi2, Supplier Code of Conduct 
Neglect 
Tier-1-based (only first-tier 
suppliers, no obligation to 
evaluate, select and develop lower 
tiers) 
“We evaluate and select just our direct suppliers for sustainable criteria.” Furn2, Corporate Senior Buyer Timber 
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Table 2: Critical themes to manage lower tier supply networks 




“Our customers from the consumer electronics industry push us to implement sustainable procurement practices 
even with our sub-suppliers.” Semi1, Sustainability Director 
“To respond to a major customer’s request for tenders, we needed to provide environmental information on certain 
materials up to tier-3.” Furn1, Chief Executive Officer 
Structural supply network complexity 
“We have a verification problem in our supply network if we want to evaluate beyond first-tier suppliers that 
requires effort to generate transparency of second-tier suppliers and beyond.” Semi1, Sustainability Director  
Product and industry salience 
“We must have a clear view of what is going on at the second- and third-tier suppliers and that is why we seek to 
increase transparency through sub-supplier audits.” Semi1, Purchasing Director 
Behavioral 
uncertainty 
Past incidents in the focal 
firm’s/competitors’ supply network 
“We were informed by an NGO that children were collecting raw material in fields at an Indian sub-supplier.” 
Pharma2, Director CSR 
“We re-designed our supply chain in the 1990’s in South East Asia in order not to face the same trouble that [one of 
their main competitors] had.” Appa1, Chief Sourcing Officer 
Socio economic and cultural distance 
“Major challenges for us are the cultural and regulatory differences between western European countries and 
emerging markets, such as China.” Appa2, Strategic Sustainability Coordinator 
“It is absolutely essential that we meet our suppliers and their sub-supplier in the region; otherwise their 
commitment towards us is low.”  Appa2, Specialist Sustainability Strategy 
Asset  
specificity 
Lower tier supplier dependency 
“Dropping or shifting suppliers is not an option in many cases [in the case of specialty raw materials and 
chemicals] due to the high market concentration.” Pharma2, Associate Director Group Procurement 
“Due to the comparative economic advantages of our supply network in South East Asia it does not make sense to 
bring back our operations to Germany.” Appa1, Chief Sourcing Officer 
Table 3: Contextual factors leading to perceived sustainability risk 
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medium  low high high high high high high medium medium low low 






















in the supply 
networkd 





high medium  high  medium low low high high medium low high high 
















medium medium high medium medium low low low medium low medium medium 
 Aggregate PSR high  medium high medium medium low high medium medium low medium medium 
Notes: a: Each of these constructs is measured on a three-point scale (high, medium and low); b: The underlying factors of stakeholder salience are measured based on the firm’s 
main stakeholder that pushes it to implement sustainability practices. For Chem1, Chem2 and Semi1, the firms’ shareholders are their main stakeholders. Pharma1 and Appa1 
indicated NGOs to be their main stakeholders. Pharma2, Pack1, Pack2 and Appa2 are mainly driven by their customers, whereas the government has the largest influence for 
Furn2 and Semi2; c: Based on vertical, horizontal and spatial complexity (Choi and Hong, 2002); d: Based on the quantity of supplier sustainability incidents over the last seven 
years; e: Based on the aggregated Hofstede (1980) scales (all six dimensions) for the most important supplier region; f: Total number of critical lower tier supplier.  
Table 4: Strength of contextual factors throughout the cases 
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Holistic medium low medium low low low high low medium low medium medium 
Product-
specific 
medium low medium low medium low high low medium medium medium low 
Region-specific medium low medium low low low high low low low high medium 









high medium high medium medium low high low low low medium low 
Alliance-based high high high high medium low high high medium  low high high 
Compliance-
based 







Tier-1-based low low low Low low high low low low high low low 
Notes: a: Each of these constructs is measured on a three-point scale (high, medium, low) based on the intensity with which it is pursued. 
 
Table 5: Overview of LTSM approaches across cases 
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Figure 1: Concluding research framework and propositions 
